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Chapter 11  
EU Civil Dialogue & the European Citizens’ Initiative:  
Accounting for collaboration and competition using the Advocacy Coalition 
Framework and the Strategic Action Field  
 
Justin Greenwood 
(Robert Gordon University, Aberdeen, UK) 
 
Incumbents and challengers 
The European Citizens’ Initiative (ECI) has introduced a largely new set of 
campaigners working in a fresh ‘direct democracy’ frame at EU level, alongside 
an established group of Brussels based EU NGOs seeking to institutionalise an 
elite ‘civil dialogue’ between themselves and EU institutions.  It therefore 
provides an ideal empirical setting to evaluate explanatory frameworks designed 
to account for circumstances where challengers emerge viz. incumbents, and for 
conflict and collaboration.  If ‘the worth of any theory is measured by how well it 
accords with empirical evidence’ (Fligstein & McAdam, 2011, p.23), how well 
does their ‘Strategic Action Field’ (SAF) theory perform in comparison to another 
other meso-level theory designed to account for rival coalitions and the 
consequences of their interaction, the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF)? 
How well do these accounts perform when seeking to explain collaboration and 
conflict, as well as change and stability?  
Following an account of these contending frameworks and an assessment of 
their points of comparability, they are put to the empirical test, assisted by the 
legacy of the respective authors applying their frameworks to European contexts 
(Marks and McAdam, 1996; Sabatier, 1998). As outlined in Chapter 1, the EU 
fosters coalition behaviour between civil society organisations, and which is 
apparent from the account of the incumbent ‘civil dialogue order’ which follows 
the exposition of the SAF and ACF frameworks.  An account of the development 
of the European Citizens’ Initiative within the terms of the SAF and ACF 
frameworks is then provided, with a particular focus on the emergence and 
establishment of the ECI in the EU system.  The analysis uses evidence about 
the ECI drawn from a mixture of official information sources, ECI campaign 
websites, participation in three official ECI support events in the period 2012-
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2014i, and long-term knowledge of the EU system of interest representation 
(Greenwood, 1997; 2003; 2007; 2011). A long time frame of analysis is one of 
the central conditions for the ACF to chart the ways in which belief systems 
adapt into policy orientated beliefs.  Although the incumbents are longer 
established in EU arenas, the challengers’ presence since the 2002-3 Convention 
on the Future of Europe (‘Convention’) meets the critical temporal criterion for 
mutual adaptation so central to the ACF. A concluding section assesses which of 
the framework best fits the course of events described below.   
The Strategic Action Field and Advocacy Coalition Framework: 
contending paradigms 
Much of what the SAF seeks to offer is captured by Fligstein & McAdam’s 
key metaphor of ‘jockeying around in a game where (actors) are playing to 
maintain or improve their position’ (ibid., p.21).  Whilst drawing from 
institutional theory the core idea of ‘socially constructed arenas within which 
actors with various resource endowments vie for advantage’ (ibid., p.3), they 
seek to go beyond it with a more dynamic and agent centred account of how 
fields emerge and/or are transformed.  A key departure from constructivist 
accounts, where actors are held to ‘follow scripts telling them what to do’ (ibid., 
p.21) is that players in the SAF framework ‘make moves and other actors have 
to interpret them, consider their options, and act’ (ibid.,p.5).  The authors 
acknowledge the inheritance from the study of social movements of core 
concepts of: ‘framing, political opportunity, rupture and settlement, episodes of 
contention, incumbents and challengers’ (ibid.,p.22).  They offer however a 
more explicit treatment of power relations by focusing on the ways in which 
incumbents may use their dominant position to enforce compliance with a 
particular reference framework such as a governance mechanism.  This 
emphasis on power relations, with implicit overtones of agenda-control found in 
the second and third dimensions of power (Lukes, 1974), is also held to make 
the SAF better equipped to account for processes of stability and order than the 
legacy provided by the study of social movements.  Nonetheless, in common 
with field theories as a whole, the homogenising effect on organisations 
belonging to a particular field (Chapter 1) may lead it to over-emphasise 
collaboration and to under-specify conflict, partly because the treatment of 
power is often more implicit than explicit in the SAF framework. 
The SAF’s attempt to incorporate power relations does however provide a 
point of distinction from another meso-level theory grounded in iterative 
interactions in socially constructed orders, the Advocacy Coalition Framework 
(ACF).  Nonetheless, the ACF gives a central place to goal conflicts, tracing the 
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source of policy change to changes in the belief systems of contending advocates 
in a policy sub-system during interactions over long periods of time and from 
there to governance systems (Sabatier, 1988). The ACF policy system/sub-
system is explicitly referenced by Fligstein & McAdam as their ‘meso level social 
order,’ (Fligstein & McAdam, 2012, p.9) which they illustrate through a ‘Russian 
doll’ metaphor (p.3).  Whilst the ACF is a theory of policy change, and the SAF 
an account of the emergence and transformation of fields, the foundations of 
interaction between rival advocates as a source of change and stability make 
them well suited for comparison.   
Differentiation between the SAF and ACF is not about what they are trying 
to account for, but over their treatment of power, as well as degrees of 
emphasis between structure and agency.  In the SAF model, governance 
mechanisms are identified as a means of enforcement of the dominant order, 
whereas the ACF model places policy makers participating alongside expert 
advocates in a more pragmatically positioned shared learning knowledge and 
information pool.  These sources of expertise help legislators to chart a course in 
times of uncertainty in the ACF model, much in the same way predicted by 
institutional theory where actors follow scripts (routines, advice, best practice) 
telling them what to do.  This differs from the emphasis on agency in the Social 
Action Field where ‘actors with varying resource endowments vie for advantage’ 
(Fligstein & McAdam, 2011, p.3).  The ACF emphasis on the ways in which 
skilled policy entrepreneurs exercise leadership in linking solutions to problems 
to bring about changes in policy (Sabatier and Weible, 2007, p.203; Kingdon 
1995 in ibid.) also distinguishes it from the SAF.  Whilst the latter lays emphasis 
on the ‘social skills’ of field actors, it is more a relational concept in 
interpretation of the acts of others and devising responses.  Nonetheless, the 
extent of the connection between the two frameworks is apparent from  
revisions of the ACF framework seeking to draw explicitly upon McAdam’s 
comparative work on social movements (Mc Adam et al, 1996; Sabatier and 
Weible, 2007), and in particular upon the inter-organisational and inter-personal 
linkages which tie network actors together (chapter 1).  Ruzza’s concept of 
movement advocacy coalitions (chapter 1, chapter 2) to some extent draws 
upon each tradition, although not to the extent of changing the identity of 
coalition members in the way in which contextual belief systems binds together 
participants in the advocacy coalition framework. 
Incumbents in search of a ‘Civil Dialogue’  
Shortly before the Convention set about drafting a Constitutional Treaty for 
Europe (eventually, the Lisbon Treaty), a long-term issue about how to make a 
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better connection between EU institutions and civil society had re-surfaced 
prominently in the European Commission’s 2001 White Paper on Governance 
(WPG).  The EU shares with other transnational political systems a structural 
distance from civil society, acute because of the extent of EU derived legislation 
in member states coupled with limited participation in European Parliament 
elections (43 per cent turnout in 2009 and 2014).  The traditional pathway 
followed by EU institutions in seeking to address these problems had been to use 
interest groups and the like as, inter alia, the best available proxy for civil 
society, and the WPG set about trying to introduce a new set of rules to govern 
it. The WPG was, in essence, a search for participative based legitimacy, and if 
EU institutions were to be dependent on dialogue with interest groups it needed 
to be placed on a legitimate structured footing.  As with other international 
organisations, the choice juxtaposed a pluralist pathway of competition between 
a teeming population of groups underpinned by a regulatory framework centred 
on transparency and redressing information asymmetries, or a more corporatist 
pathway trodden by other international organisations involving special 
recognition of a small number of groups with certain desired criteria. 
The WPG incorporated thinking from a policy document issued in 2000 in 
the name of the European Commission President and a Vice President, ‘The 
Commission and NGOs: building a stronger partnership’ (‘Partnership’) 
(European Commission, 2000). The ‘Partnership’ paper had proposed desired 
properties for NGOs of ‘representativeness…of their roots in the different 
Member States of the European Union’ and ‘their track record and ability to 
contribute substantial policy inputs’ (European Commission, 2000, p.9).  One of 
the lead NGOs established at EU level, the Platform of European Social NGOs 
(Social Platform), submitted a response on behalf of itself and two longer 
established ‘families’ of EU NGOs (Development, and Environment); in the terms 
of chapter 1, this was a ‘third level’ meta network response on behalf of ‘second 
level’ platform organisations.  The Social Platform was a creation of EU 
institutions in the mid-1990s with a brief of bridging EU institutions with citizens, 
but consisting of members who were other NGOs in the social policy field 
organised at EU level. Its claims to legitimacy therefore rest on functional, rather 
than territorial, representativeness, and its response to the ‘Partnership’ paper 
unsurprisingly baulked at the concept of territorial representativeness, proposing 
instead a legal basis to a ‘civil dialogue’ (Social Platform, 2000).  In pursuit of its 
remit it held two open events for citizens in Brussels during 1997-8, but which 
were largely unsuccessful in attracting a presence beyond the ‘usual suspects’ of 
NGOs in the ‘Brussels bubble’.  These events framed ‘bridging the EU with 
citizens’ as the need for a ‘civil dialogue’ between EU institutions and NGOs 
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organised at EU level, and the choice of the Social Platform to deliver a collective 
response to the consultation on the ‘Partnership’ paper crystallised both the 
emergence of a ‘family of families’ of EU NGOs and the place of the Social 
Platform at its head.   
The WPG incorporated the thinking in the Partnership paper on the 
justification that ‘with better involvement comes greater responsibility’ 
(European Commission, 2001, p.15).  It therefore offered a system of ‘more 
extensive partnership arrangements’ for groups who could ‘furnish guarantees of 
representativity and prove their capacity to relay information or lead the debate 
in the Member States’ (European Commission, 2001, p.17).  The responses to 
the WPG from the European Parliament, and from member states with pluralist 
traditions, discouraged this corporatist approach, such that by the time the 
Commission converted the WPG into a concrete framework of consultation 
standards, ‘representativeness’ had dissolved into a weaker and more pluralist 
form involving transparency of membership (European Commission, 2002). 
Consultation over these consultation standards was the moment at which the 
Social Platform sought to re-frame ‘representativeness’ from a territorial 
property into a functional one, coupled with the ‘track record’ which had 
appeared in the Partnership document (Social Platform, 2002).  A ‘civil dialogue’, 
based around itself at the at the head of a ‘family of families’ of EU NGOs, had 
become the Social Platform goal, in much the way foreseen by SAF ‘jockeying for 
position’. 
A key entrepreneur in the emergence of the Social Platform at the head of 
a family of families of NGOs had been its President, Giampiero Alhadeff, who 
also held the position of Secretary General of another EU NGO well linked to the 
trade union movement.   Since the 1992 Treaty on European Union, trade unions 
at EU level have participated in a ‘social dialogue’ with employer organisations 
with special delegated powers and institutional recognition, and which provided 
an aspiration for the NGOs ‘civil dialogue’ campaign.  Alhadeff’s proactive actions 
viz. trade unions on behalf of the Social Platform, co-opting them into an alliance 
seeking something potentially competitive to their social dialogue, and adding 
them as an associate of the new family coalition of NGOs, looks much like the 
emphasis on actor social skills cast in the SAF account.  The ACF has no 
corresponding tool, but incorporates of a slightly different mechanism focused on 
ways through which policy entrepreneurs seek to attach solutions to problems 
(Kingdon, 1995), relating civil dialogue to the EU’s legitimacy deficit.  The new 
NGO family lobbied the Convention for a Civil Dialogue as the Act4Europe 
coalition with the trade union movement.  In SAF terms, it was an attempt to 
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‘reinforce the dominant logic, and safeguard the interests of the incumbents’ 
(Fligstein & McAdam, p.6).  However, the Convention simply codified long 
standing practices of dialogue between EU institutions and civil society into parts 
1-3 of Article 11 of the Treaty on European Union, but without any new status, 
rights or nomenclature attached to it.  In essence, Articles 1-3 require EU 
institutions to do nothing more remarkable than engage in an institutionalised 
dialogue with whoever is so inclined to talk with them about their policy 
proposals.   
Despite the unsuccessful Civil Dialogue campaign, Act4Europe developed 
after the Convention into an enduring alliance as the Civil Society Contact Group 
(CSCG), with a secretariat shared between different NGO families and hosted by 
one of the core family members.  In the ACF framework a coalition is foreseen 
as a shared belief advocacy community solving collective action problems and a 
willingness to distribute costs fairly. In the SAF framework, its creation reflects 
the ‘creation of identities, political coalitions, and interests to promote the 
control of actors vis-à-vis other actors’ (ibid., p.6-7).  After an initial period of 
expansion, CSCG members have taken the decision to limit the size and 
collective identity of the CSCG to themselves.    The wealthiest members of 
these families tend to act at the periphery because of their self-sufficiency, while 
the poorest members are strongly reliant upon the core members to develop a 
critical mass for their campaigns.  At the core are NGOs with sufficient resources 
to host key coalition facilities yet sufficient needs to require working coalitions 
for most of their campaigns.  These descriptions match the roles of coalition 
members, where resource self-sufficient families of NGOs (Development, and 
Environment) operate at the periphery and the poorest (Culture, Education) 
remain dependent on the two central coalition members and hosts since its 
inception, the Social Platform and (since around the start of the ECI) the 
European Public Health Alliance (EPHA).  The Social Platform did nonetheless 
achieve its own place with the social partners at the twice-yearly informal (‘night 
before’ the full meeting of the) Employment, Social Policy, Health and Consumer 
Affairs Council (EPSCO) of the EU Council of Ministers.  The civil dialogue 
campaign continued beyond the Convention in the form of advocacy to resurrect 
a ‘European Statute of Associations’ led by a group of French NGOs (Kendall & 
Fraisse, 2011), and a proposal for a ‘Compact’ of quasi-legal standards to 
underpin dialogue between organisations and EU institutions comparable with 
models in some member states.   
The Social Platform was to re-advocate an accreditation system during the 
period when the ECI was in its formative process. It responded to the European 
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Commission’s 2010 public consultation on how to operationalise the ECI by 
attempting instead to re-frame the issue into how to achieve its ambition for a 
civil dialogue:  
‘Social Platform calls on the European Commission to launch a public 
consultation on how to implement the first part of the Lisbon Treaty article 
11 on civil dialogue…Social Platform would like to stress that the right to 
petition is not the only new instrument related to participatory democracy 
that the Treaty of Lisbon introduces into EU decision making processes.  
The first part of article 11 (which regards civil dialogue) requires all EU 
institutions to implement new mechanisms of dialogue with civil society (as 
opposed to consultations, run by the European Commission as it is the case 
now). Given that the European Commission has not revised its procedures 
to dialogue with citizens for almost a decade, we believe it is time for the 
European Commission to discuss with civil society organisations how this 
new mechanisms of dialogue should take place in the future between EU 
institutions and organised civil society.’ (Social Platform, 2010b; original 
wording) 
Two other members of the Social Platform ‘family’ submitted identical responses.  
In SAF terms, the response of the Platform was entirely readable as an attempt 
by a ‘skilled strategic actor in (an) incumbent group(s) to produce and reproduce 
a status quo…in response to an emerging crisis, incumbents are apt- at least 
initially – to appeal to the status quo’ (Fligstein & McAdam, 2011, p.7).  
The civil dialogue campaign of today continues to make explicit reference to 
the social dialogue:   
next to the social dialogue between trade unions and employers, there is a 
need for a civil dialogue that can enrich our representative democracies 
with participatory democracy…Civil society organisations do not currently 
take part in structured dialogue and yet it is these groups who are 
directly affected by European decisions (Social Platform, 2014a) 
(emphasis added). 
‘Jockeying for position’ seems a plausible explanation for discourse in which 
citizens are seemingly forgotten and advocacy groups positioned as the ones 
directly affected by European decisions. But in SAF terms, the Civil Dialogue 
concept was never sufficiently appealing to withstand criticism of a participatory 
model based around ‘Brussels talking to Brussels’ (European Commission, 
2002)., i.e. ‘lobby groups’ as surrogates for an otherwise absent civil society in 
dialogue with EU institutions. The Convention set in motion an altogether 
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different participatory mechanism in the form of the European Citizens’ 
Initiative.  The SAF framework predicts that ‘as the commitment to the ongoing 
structure collapses, new actors can be expected to join the fray’ (Fligstein & 
McAdam, 2011, p.10).  
 
The Challengers: the ECI and a direct participatory frame 
Towards the end of the Convention, a group of direct democracy activists, 
clustered around the German based NGO Democracy International, successfully 
lobbied (de Clerk Sachsse, 2012; Kaufman, 2012) for the introduction of a new 
direct participation instrument, the European Citizens’ Initiative.  This wholly 
new idea in an EU context struck a chord sufficient to become incorporated into 
the 2009 Lisbon Treaty as Article 11(4) of the Treaty on European Union (TEU).  
The Treaty provision is implemented by Regulation 211/2011 of the European 
Parliament and Council, in which one million validated signatures collected from 
EU citizens during a 12 month registration period, drawn from at least a quarter 
of member statesii, with weighted minimum quotas specified for each state, can 
request the European Commission to bring forward proposals on any topic falling 
within EU Treaty competencies.   
The direct democracy activists mobilised around a direct participatory 
element for the EU were entirely different from the ‘associative democracy’ EU 
NGOs who had sought the insertion of a civil dialogue into the draft Treaty, such 
that the latter had played no role in lobbying for the insertion of the ECI into the 
Treaty drafted by the Convention (de Clerk Sachsse, 2012).  In ACF terms, the 
respective ‘policy core policy preferences’ had ‘been a major source of cleavage 
for some time’ (Sabatier and Jenkins Smith, 1999, p.134), where ‘policy core 
policy preferences might be the stickiest glue that binds coalitions together’ 
(Sabatier and Weible, 2007, p.195). In what follows, ‘the ACF assumes that 
policy participants strive to translate components of their belief systems into 
actual policy before their opponents can do the same’ (ibid., p.196) provides a 
script to follow, just as much as the SAF emphasis on governance frameworks as 
a means for an incumbent group to assert the status quo. 
If most of the established EU civil society organisations initially ignored the 
new direct participatory instrument, a small number engaged with it as a form of 
positioning in much the way anticipated by the SAF emphasis on ‘vying for 
advantage’.  One key member of the Social Platform operated an unofficial 
signature collection campaign in the period between the adoption of the Lisbon 
Treaty in 2009 and the official start of the ECI in 2012.  The European Disability 
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Forum’s (EDF) campaign ‘1million 4disability’ was the most successful of the 
unofficial campaigns in collecting signaturesiii, yet it failed to build on its success 
by launching a campaign after the official start of the ECI.  EDF is one of a 
number of disability advocacy NGOs in the Social Platform, and the EDF ‘pilot’ 
campaign seems to be captured by the metaphor of ‘jockeying for position’ when 
its Director reflected that it had been 
Beneficial to EDF in terms of recognition by the EU institutions as a very 
representative organization which was able to mobilise such a large number 
of its members and citizens.’ (Carlotta Besozzi, correspondence, 4.6.2013). 
The group of direct democracy activists mobilised around getting the ECI 
into the EU Treaties were also those who mobilised around the experimental 
‘Citizens Agoras’ of 2008-9 led by Commissioner Wallstrom, around which the 
‘civil dialogue’ crowd had been no more than peripheral figures.  The concept 
has since been adapted in ‘Citizens Dialogue’ roadshow events around the 
member states following on from the ‘European Year of Citizens 2013,’ in which 
the ‘civil dialogue’ organisations needed to show willing.  For the Social Platform, 
a confederated status has meant that it has been unable to play a leading role in 
these Citizens’ events, yet at the same time its advocacy ‘on behalf of the 
citizens’ required it to at least show support, reflected by its membership of the 
steering committee of the ‘European Year of Citizens Alliance 2013’ (EYCA) led 
by a network based outside of Belgium.  This trajectory is also evident in its 
belated reconciliation with the ECI as a ‘second tier’ supporter of the most 
successful ECI signature collection campaign led by the trade unions against 
water privatisation, considered in further detail below. This behaviour is foreseen 
by the SAF’s concept of a ‘refurbished institutional re-settlement’ (Fligstein & 
McAdam, p.10), while the advocacy coalition framework also comfortably fields 
the change with its focus on policy orientated learning where actors 
pragmatically adjust to new realities (Sabatier, 1988), particularly over aspects 
than are means (‘secondary policy beliefs’ in the ACF framework) rather than 
ends.   
The requirement for ECIs to be organized by a Citizens’ Committee 
comprising seven individuals from seven member states reflects a desire to draw 
a clear distinction for the measure from dialogue involving EU institutions and 
‘representative associations’ (Article 11.2, TEU). The institutional Vice-Presidents 
responsible for the measure from the European Commission and European 
Parliament have emphasised the intention that the measure should not be 
‘hijacked by lobbyists’ (Mason, 2012) and that ‘an ECI is not for NGOs, but for all 
citizens’ (EurActiv, 2011). Likewise, the websites of a number of the first official 
	 ‘This	is	an	electronic	pre‐publication	(including	pre‐proofs)	version	of	an	article	published	in		
 H Johansson and S Kalm (eds.) EU Civil Society: Patterns of Cooperation, Competition and Conflict (Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillan), and available at https://www.palgrave.com/gb/book/9781137500700 
    10 
 
ECI campaigns have made a virtue of the distinction between themselves and EU 
level professionalised advocacy organisations in Brusselsiv.  Despite this clear 
demarcation, it can be expected that the individual members of Citizens’ 
Committees will have links to advocacy organisations in varying degrees.  Whilst 
registering an initiative which falls within EU competencies is a relatively 
straightforward process, the data protection requirements for systems for online 
signature collection, in particular, are burdensome to the point that navigating 
them requires collective resources well beyond those of seven private 
individuals. The threshold of one million signatures requires access to 
established networks, which, to date, only three campaigns (linked to the trade 
union movement, the Catholic Church, and animal welfare organisations, 
respectively) have been able to achieve.  Only the first of these campaigns was 
driven by advocacy organisations established at EU level, whereas the others 
originated among established movements in the member states.   
Establishing links between Citizens’ Committees and supporting 
organisations is not a straightforward task.  The Commission requires 
Committees to declare sources of financial support on the website, but most 
declare funding of less than €10,000, often from private individuals.  Onward 
links from the ECI website to those of individual campaigns are another way of 
linking citizens committees to advocacy organisations.  Following these, and 
other, links, the European Citizens’ Action Service (ECAS) support unit for the 
ECI concludes that only eight of the 47 ECIs so far presented to the European 
Commission originate from EU wide organisations, while as many campaigns 
originate from newly formed entities (ECAS, 2014; see also Bouza Garcia and 
Greenwood, 2014).  Most registered ECIs originate away from Brussels, either as 
part of transnational movements (rather than NGOs) or among advocacy 
organisations in the member states.  In addition to these are the 20 would-be 
campaigns which were refused registration by the European Commission, of 
which only two originate from EU NGOs (Bouza Garcia and Greenwood, 2014; 
figures updated).  The Director of the Greenpeace European Unit reflected that 
‘An ECI may be a useful tool as part of a campaign that aims to raise 
awareness and create some political momentum on lesser known issues of 
public interest that otherwise get little media and political attention. I do 
not rate it very highly as a point of leverage on the big legislative issues 
that Greenpeace usually fights on…the outcome from an ECI depends on 
the goodwill of the Commission. With the current Commission, a million 
euro spent on lobbyists gets you further than a million signatures, 
regrettably…we do not rule out starting another ECI, but the effort involved 
is significant, and can be a distraction from keeping up with and countering 
industry lobbyists (Jorgo Riss, correspondence, 14.6.2013). 
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With its lack of mandation on EU institutions, the ECI is primarily an 
agenda-setting tool, and therefore of limited appeal to professionalised EU NGOs 
which have other institutionalised channels to raise their issues, ranging from 
advisory committees and EU policy forums through to the bilateral networks they 
have built in Brussels. Whilst both Greenpeace and Friends of the Earth 
conducted pilot signature collection campaigns before the official start of the 
measure, and Friends of the Earth make an unsuccessful attempt to register an 
ECI soon after its official start, each of these campaigns were conducted through 
their offices in the member states rather than their Brussels EU ‘policy’ offices.  
The present-day EU system more incentivises institutional advocacy more than 
public campaigning (Warleigh, 2001; Sudbery, 2003), and in this context the 
view of Riss, the Head of the Greenpeace EU policy office, is unsurprising.  
Where Citizens’ Initiatives have direct law making effect, such as California, so 
the measure has been taken up for use by systemic lobby groups attached to 
the political system, but where they lack legislative effect the measure is largely 
left to outsiders (Smith, 2009; Cuesta Lopez, 2012). 
By way of emphasis of the difference between the professionalised world of 
Brussels lobbying and the majority of ECI campaigns, the thirteen campaigns 
running the full course without meeting the signature threshold have fallen short 
by a long way, ranging from 780 to 285,000 signatures.  At the highest end of 
this spectrum is the Unconditional Basic Income (UBI) campaign, originating 
from the radical transnational ATTAC movement.  For the remaining campaigns 
the collection of signatures seems to have been one of a number of goals; the 
co-ordinator of one Campaign Committee responded pointedly to a request to 
disclose the final signature tally that ‘I'm afraid we feel that the importance and 
success of an ECI is not measured by the number of signatures’ 
(correspondence, 5.2.2014).  A commentator from Democracy International, co-
organiser of an ‘ECI Day’ conference held in April 2013, reflected on her way 
home from the day’s proceedings that:  
‘Many ECI organisers admitted that they had launched an ECI merely for 
reasons of public relations and networking, while lacking belief that they 
could actually reach the amount of one million signatures.’ (Pfafferott, 
2013) 
 
There is supporting evidence from some campaigns for this observation, 
but it does not accurately capture the diversity of ECI campaigns.  There can be 
little doubt that for some the mechanism has provided an opportunity to get 
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noticed, establish an organisation structure and attract longer-term supporters.  
The 30kmh in urban areas and A High Quality European Education for All 
campaigns which themselves saw the main legacy in these ways, while other 
campaigns were linked to promoting a project (in one case, an EU news channel) 
or seemingly linked to career interests in EU politics. Act4Growth was led by a 
member of the European Economic and Social Committee, while a number of 
campaigns bear the hallmarks of student activists with an EU studies flavour, or 
simply cohorts of interested Masters Students experimenting with the device, 
withdrawing a campaign shortly after successful registration.   
There are a number of campaigns which are clearly using the ECI for much 
more than jockeying for position.  The trade union movement, in particular, had 
long demonstrated its ability to combine institutional advocacy at EU level with 
mass mobilisation for protest politics (Leiren and Parks, 2014).  This made it well 
placed to take up the concept of a direct participatory element, initially through 
an unofficial campaign before the start of the ECI, and afterwards by conducting 
(on a different topic) the most successful ECI signature collection campaign to 
date. For the established trade union movement, the ECI was a successful 
means to ensure that general principles of market liberalisation did not become 
institutionalised as a source of water privatisation at national level.  The 
European Commissioner for the Internal Market and Services, Michel Barnier, 
responded with an explicit statement that this was not, and never had been, his 
goal, and gave an undertaking that the Concessions Directive, the focus of trade 
union anxieties, did not mean privatisation through the back-door (European 
Commission, 2013).  Whilst it is impossible to assess whether the campaign had 
achieved more than a line in the sand, and, if so, whether a lobbying campaign 
might have succeeded in defeating any such proposal, the use of the ECI seems 
to be an informed tactical choice in an EU orientated campaign against 
privatisation.  An alternative explanation could however be that social partner 
status meant that trade unions operating at EU level had no need to perceive the 
new ECI as a challenge to their established position.    
Other ECI campaigns also seem readable in the straightforward terms of 
the advocacy issues they sought to introduce to EU politics.  Campaigns aimed 
at legalising cannabis, and ending legalised prostitution, introduced new topics 
to EU politics, with the former successful with its registration and which acquired 
well over 100,000 signatures.  Among withdrawn initiatives, the seemingly 
maverick campaign to punish Switzerland for its alleged mistreatment of foreign 
workers looks on closer inspection to have been a tactical means of getting 
publicity in the Swiss media, never progressing to the stage of signature 
	 ‘This	is	an	electronic	pre‐publication	(including	pre‐proofs)	version	of	an	article	published	in		
 H Johansson and S Kalm (eds.) EU Civil Society: Patterns of Cooperation, Competition and Conflict (Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillan), and available at https://www.palgrave.com/gb/book/9781137500700 
    13 
 
collection.  The €150,000 spent by an alliance led by producer related 
organisations on the Dairy Cow Welfare campaign, withdrawn after three 
months, seems to have simply been an underestimation of the resources 
required to achieve the signature threshold.  The ‘jockeying for position’ 
metaphor similarly fails to capture the diversity involved with refused requests 
for registrations.  Five Campaign Committees have taken the expensive route of 
referring to the European Court of Justice the European Commission’s rejection 
of their application to register an ECI campaign.v  This may be a means to 
prolong, or bring further life to, campaigns, but only one of the five (calling for a 
cancellation of Greek debt) is unlikely to have been surprised by their rejection, 
with the other four having first obtained detailed legal counsel before lodging 
their application to register an initiative.  The most recent of these cases, the 
‘Stop TTIP’ (Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership), originated with 
Democracy International, who may have wanted a high-profile campaign as an 
ECI, but which had little need for positioning as the established direct democracy 
advocate.  By contrast, the ACF reliance upon institutional socialisation and 
policy sub-systems seems to allow for a smoother integration of ECI 
campaigners than ‘jockeying for position’. 
The ECI continues to feature regularly in lists of ‘innovations’ drawn up by 
EU institutions about the way in which the Lisbon Treaty strengthens 
connections with citizens, with its direct participatory character regularly 
highlighted.  As such, both the European Commission and the European 
Parliament have gone to some lengths to try to make the measure work.  During 
the establishment phase of the ECI, the Commission lent its own servers to 
campaigns experiencing difficulties with meeting the technical specifications for 
online signature collection.  In seeking to promote the measure, the Commission 
has partnered with those few EU NGOs founded on a niche frame of ‘citizens 
direct’, and most notably with the European Citizens’ Action Service (ECAS).  
ECAS has differentiated itself from the civil dialogue crowd since its foundation in 
1991, fulfilling contracts with the European Commission aimed at establishing 
direct connections with citizens, such as telephone hotlines for citizens 
experiencing difficulties in enforcing their free movement rights.  ECAS was one 
of the very few EU NGOs to join activists from an early stage in detailed 
campaigning work in support of the ECI.  Whilst this positioned it well to host the 
‘Citizens House’ support mechanism for the ECI, part-funded by the European 
Commission, the ECI more seems to present a moment when a longer standing 
ECAS outlook about direct forms of citizen participation has come to fruition, 
rather than ‘jockeying for position’.  In the Brussels ‘field’, ECAS is neither a civil 
dialogue incumbent nor challenger, nor a contending advocate, but more an 
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organisation bridging the two worlds of civil dialogue and direct democracy.  It 
has joined the civil dialogue crowd in advocating quasi-legal standards (or more) 
to underpin dialogue between civil society organisations and EU institutions, yet 
direct democracy activists have a central position in its networks.  Ruzza’s 
concept of a movement advocacy coalition, in which coalition partners span 
professionalised social movements (Chapters 1 and 2; see also Chapter 5 on 
professionalised social movements) and NGOs, without necessarily changing the 
identity of participants, seems to better capture what ECAS is about than do 
either the SAF or ACF. 
Conclusion: the ACF and SAF interpretations compared 
Aspects of the ECI’s introduction into a field dominated by an alternative frame 
of reference are open to narration as a story of incumbents and challengers 
interactively jockeying for position.   The question is more whether the SAF does 
justice to the full empirical picture which emerges, and whether it adds value to 
existing explanatory tools.  On these criteria there is room for doubt.  The ECI 
brings a new instrument to cultivate a ‘European public sphere’, has already 
mobilised a new set of actors to engage with EU public policy, and challenges a 
group of established incumbents to include public campaigning in support of 
their advocacy with EU institutions.  ECI campaigns contain substantial diversity, 
which key SAF metaphors fail to capture in breadth.  The ECI was designed to be 
a change agent in a field which needed instruments of direct citizen 
participation, and will require some re-adjustment in a community set up for 
institutionalised advocacy.  In this, the ECI is the key policy event, and the 
emphasis on the ways in which organisations can learn to live with an event 
which may initially be interpreted as challenging, and even turn it to their 
advantage, is already well captured by the Advocacy Coalition Framework.  
Issues surrounding withdrawn and rejected initiatives, and responses to 
administrative actions of the European Commission, are also difficult to explain 
using the SAF framework.  The European trade union movement’s use of the 
ECI, and the niche occupied by ECAS, involve cases where the two worlds of 
institutionalised politics and direct participation have been successfully mixed.  
Neither the SAF nor the ACF frameworks are particularly helpful in placing 
organisations capable of working in, and between, these frames.  As ever, a 
combination of explanations couched in rational choice, and institutional, 
traditions seems to prevail.  The SAF tries to be this, giving it an advantage over 
the more pluralist ACF in its more explicit treatment of power relations, and 
providing it with a better ability to predict outcomes.  But its emphasis on the 
role of agency more than structure, in actors making moves and others having 
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to interpret them, leads it to be more a theory of change than stability, despite 
its claims to the contrary.  This emphasis helps it to develop mechanisms of 
change, such as social skills, which are valuable but hardly innovative, and give 
it some advantage over the ACF where mechanisms of change are often more 
implicit than stated.  These points may be fair game to those who see in both 
concepts a tendency to state the obvious.  As the SAF framework models, 
incumbents can be expected to use governance mechanisms to enforce stability, 
but even there the SAF casts a restless process: 
 
  ‘In our view, SAFs tend toward one of three states: unorganized or 
emerging, organized and stable but changing, and organized and unstable 
and open to transformation.’  (Fligstein & McAdam, 2011, p.1) 
 
In this process, 
 
 ‘Challengers can be expected to engage in a constant testing of the 
stability of the field, probing through their actions to assess the overall 
vulnerability of incumbents or more proximate rivals’ (ibid., p.15). 
 
Empirical evidence of this from the ECI is scarce on the ground.  In sum, it 
seems that the SAF is strong where it comes to explaining change, and in these 
circumstances better than the ACF because it is centred on incumbents and 
challengers locked in a power game.  The ACF, seemingly, can account for both 
change and stability because the source of both lies in the belief systems of rival 
advocates and exchanges via the institutional mechanisms through which they 
engage with each other.  Yet the ACF has its origins in the pluralistic politics of 
the environment, which it seems ideally suited to explain.  And yet neither 
concept are comfortable where organisations can switch easily between frames 
of institutionalised politics and protest politics, and between organised civil 
society and direct participation models.  Without explicit constructivist 
mechanisms it is easy to lose sight of the SAFs claim to have one foot in each of 
the camps of institutionalism and rational choice.    
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